HomeMy WebLinkAbout1991-12-19 - Agendas - Final•
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FIRE PENSION
AGENDA ITEMS
FOR
12-19-91
ROXBURY )
CAPITAL MANAGEMENT
October 18, 1991
Chief Mickey Jackson
Fayetteville Fire Department
303 West Center
Fayetteville, Arkansas 72701
frY
Re: Fayetteville Fireman's Pension & Relief Fund
Dear Chief Jackson:
Enclosed is a copy of our Third Quarter Client Letter, along
with an explanation on "how to read" the time weighted
performance rate of return analysis.
• Your performance analysis was sent to you under separate
cover along with your quarterly appraisal.
Sincerely,
ROXBURY CAPITAL MANAGEMENT
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ROXBURY
CAPITAL MANAGEMENT
TIME WEIGHTED PERFORMANCE RATE OF RETURN ANALYSIS
Several of our clients have asked for clarification and
assistance on how to read and interpret the Time Weighted
Performance Rate of Return Analysis sheet we include with
client reports. We are pleased to provide you with the
following explanation of this report which will hopefully
assist you in better understanding the performance of your
portfolio.
WHAT DOES "TIME WEIGHTED" PERFORMANCE
REALLY MEAN?
The money management industry generally uses time
weighted returns as its standard for performance evaluation.
Time weighted returns are calculated to eliminate the
impact of cash additions and/or withdrawals from an
account, and therefore are considered a more "pure"
measurement of performance.
!For example, if a client doubles the dollar amount invested
in a portfolio at the beginning of a quarter in which the
portfolio increases in value by 20%, the money manager
only gets credit for the percentage increase in value in
measuring performance over time, not credit for having in-
creased the dollar amount.
WHERE DO I FIND THE TIME WEIGHTED RETURNS
FOR MY SPECIFIC PORTFOLIO?
In the top half of each Time Weighted Performance Rate
of Return Analysis sheet there is a section called "With
Income". This section has the performance data for your
portfolio. "With Income" means that your performance
data includes any interest and dividends paid to your
account during a given period.
Each performance sheet will show performance for the
Total Account, and specifically for the Cash and Equiva-
lents (money market funds, etc.) portion of the total
portfolio. It will also show detail specifically for either the
Fixed Income (bonds) portion of the portfolio, the Equity
(stocks) portion of the portfolio, or both depending on the
mix of a portfolio. This will help show how each portion
of the portfolio affected the performance of the total
portfolio, and allow comparison to certain indices which we
will discuss below.
HOW DO I READ ALL THE NUMBERS ACROSS THE
PAGE9
The numbers or data going across the page are merely time
weighted performance data categorized by periods of time.
(Our explanation for these periods of time is based on
calendar years. For those of you with fiscal year ends other
than December 31, please adjust this explanation according-
ly). Although only the month and year are shown for the
beginning and end of each period (not the day), the day is
the end of that given period -i.e., 12-90 means 12-31-90.
Moving from left to right across the page, the first section
of data is quarterly data. The intent of this section is to
show you how your portfolio has performed quarterly for
approximately the past year. For those of you that have
been with us for at least a year, this section will have four
columns. The first column on the left will show data from
the last quarter end (March 31, June 30, September 30, or
December 31) through the most recent month end. If the
most recent month end was the quarter end, then this
column will show data for this completed quarter.
Moving further to the right, the next section of data is
yearly or annual data. The intent of this section is to show
you how your portfolio has performed on an annual basis
for approximately the past four years, therefore this section
has four columns. The first column on the left shows the
current year-to-date data from the beginning of the year
through the most recent month end.
The final column on the right shows performance data
since a given point in time shown in the upper right hand
corner of the page. The intent of. this column is to show
performance data over an extended period of time, usually
several years.
WIIAT ARE THF INDICES USED FOR THAT ARE ON
THE BOTTOM HALF OF THE SHEET'
The indices are benchmarks that can be used to compare
and help assess the performance of your total portfolio and
each of its components (fixed income, equities, etc.).
HOW SHOULD I USE THESE INDICES IN MAKING
COMPARISONS AND ASSESSMENTS?
Consumer Price Index
The Consumer Price Index ("CPI") is a measure of infla-
tion. Inflation is every investor's real enemy over time in
the sense that investment returns need to exceed rates of
inflation in order to increase real net worth. Therefore, a
long-term goal of most portfolios should be to achieve
investment returns that exceed inflation.
Shearson Lehman Government Corporate Bond Index
The Shearson Lehman Government Corporate Bond Index
("SLGC") is the most popular index used today for measur-
ing fixed income performance. Its composition is represen-
tative of the relative distribution of fixed income securities
in the market, exclusive of the mortgage market. Because
of the significant amount of government debt in the
marketplace today, U S government and agency debt
represents the majority of the index with the balance in
corporate debt. Therefore, in comparing this index to
actual fixed income portfolio results, one needs to keep in
perspective the actual fixed income composition of the
portfolio, i.e., does the portfolio consist of treasury and
agency bonds, investment grade corporate bonds, high yield
(junk) bonds, or a combination of the above.
Dow Jones Industrial Average With Income
The Dow Jones Industrial Average With Income ("DJIA")
is probably the least relevant of the indices we use for
comparing equity performance. We include it because it is
the most commonly referred to index when people are
talking about "the market". It only includes 30 Targe "blue
chip corporations which is not most money managers
universe. Most money managers, regardless of their
universe of stocks, are compared with the Standard &
Poors 500 With Income index.
Standard & Poors 500 With Income
The Standard & Poors 500 With Income index ("S&P 500")
is the most commonly used benchmark for comparing the
equity performance of money managers. It includes stocks
of 400 of the largest industrial companies, 20 of the largest
transportation companies, 40 of the largest utilities, and 40
of the largest financial companies in the country. Although
the S&P 500 is the most commonly used index for compar-
ing equity performance, similar to the DJIA, it is not a
particularly broad-based index as it represents only ten
percent of the total number of New York Stock Exchange,
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American Stock Exchange and actively traded OTC stocks,
and only the largest of these companies. A much more
broad-based index, and perhaps more indicative of the
overall market, is the Value Line index.
Value Line
The Value Line index is an equally -weighted index of the
stocks of about 1,700 companies. Therefore, it is more
broad-based and more indicative of the overall market
including many small -medium capitalization stocks. It is
arguably a better index in which to compare Roxbury's
equity performance as it includes most if not all of our
Category II stocks.
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ROXBURY
CAPITAL MANAGEMENT
October 15, 1991
THIRD QUARTER 1991
CLIENT LE ITER
Anthony H. Browne, Harry B. Wilson
Kevin P. Riley, James E. Moore
Enclosed is your third quarter 1991 port-
folio performance report. Roxbury port-
folios have done very well dunng 1991,
and particularly for the 12 month period
ended September 30, 1991.
Our clients frequently express bewilder-
ment at our industry's portfolio perfor-
mance reporting standards. At the risk
of adding to this confusion, we have
written and enclosed an explanation of
the terms and process of performance
measurement which we hope will be
helpful to you. In addition, we typically
highlight for you the key performance
data in the report. Please call us if you
have any questions.
The Investment Outlook: Our comments
and philosophies.
What a difference a year makes. At the
end of the third quarter 1990, predictions
of doom were plentiful. Iraq's occupa-
tion of Kuwait threatened the balance of
power in the Persian Gulf and sent oil
prices and interest rates soaring in a
weakening economy. The third quarter
of 1990 was the fourth worst stock mar-
ket quarter since 1929. A much quoted
market strategist from a leading broker-
age firm wrote. "There is more m this
bear market. The market may fall an-
other 15%."
A year later the stock and bond markets
have rebounded sharply. The stock mar-
ket averages are up over 30% since the
third quarter of 1990. Roxbury has also
done well during this period and outper-
formed the Standard and Poor's 500 and
Dow Jones Industrial Average.
The lesson? A short-term view of the
stock market is the most serious impedi-
ment to long-term success. As Peter
Lynch said upon retiring as manager of
the Magellan Fund (one of the most
successful mutual funds of all time):
"My single -most important piece of in-
vestment advice is to ignore the short-
term fluctuations of the market. From
one year to the next, the stock market is
a coin flip. It can go up or down. The
real money in stocks is made in the third
fourth and fifth year of your investments,
because you are participating in a com-
pany's earnings which grow over time."
Warren Buffett, the billionaire, supports
this view, "I do not have, never have
had, and never will have an opinion
where the stock market will be a year
from now." The legendary investor Sir
John Templeton said it best: "Ignore
fluctuations Do not try to out -guess the
stock market. Buy a quality portfolio
and invest for the long-term "
Despite this wisdom we confess to hav-
ing held roughly a 15%-20% level of
1800 Avenue of the Stars Suite 1100 Los Angeles, California 90067 213/282.0820 FAX 2131785.0651
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Third Quarter 1991 Page 2
• Client Letter
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cash at this time last year. Though this
was far less than the 50% recommended
by many market strategists, we, too, were
influenced by the uncertain prospect of a
potentially prolonged conflict in the
Middle East.
The issues concerning most investors at
this point are the economy, interest
rates, and the perceived overvaluation of
the stock market.
Interest rates have fallen in the past year
and could be headed lower, as evidence
of a strong economic rebound remains
illusive. We think that intermediate
maturities (4-10 years) offer the best
nsk/reward ratio in relation to their yield
and the current shape of the yield curve.
Federal Reserve policy, we think, will
continue to favor lower interest rates at
least until the 1992 election.
In light of the murky economic outlook
our focus is to search for and invest in
truly wonderful businesses that can with-
stand economic uncertainties. However,
we have to be able to invest at the right
price Some companies which have done
well in spite of the recession are being
richly valued. For example, we have
been studying Home Depot for two
years, and when we saw superior results
continue despite the recession we pur-
chased Home Depot stock in our all
equity portfolios at what we felt was a
reasonable price early in the summer.
Three months later Home Depot was up
40%. Home Depot is an excellent com-
pany with outstanding management but
we sold the stock as its valuations be-
came excessive. It is always difficult to
sell high quality companies but our valu-
ation disciplines tell us to sell if the mar-
gin of safety is eroded by an excessively
high stock price. Our higher than nor
mal cash levels now reflect a lack of
investment ideas at reasonable prices.
The valuation of the current stock mar-
ket is being discussed in the media at
length Given the spectacular gain m
such sectors as biotechnology we share
this concern Many point to consumer
stocks in areas such as food, beverage
and pharmaceuticals as being "expensive"
and "over popular" with investors and
hence risky versus companies more ex-
posed to the economic cycle such as
autos, metals or machinery. We are well
aware of these arguments since we are
concentrated in consumer sectors and
have avoided cyclical companies.
Don't be mislead by the press discussion
about price earnings multiple (p/e) ra-
tios. Critics of consumer stocks argue
that the p/e of these stocks are at a 20x
or more earnings versus the Standard
and Poor's 500 multiple of 19x earnings.
However, this refers to last years earn-
ings (1990) Given the predictable,
steady growth of the consumer stocks,
1992 earnings multiples are more rele-
vant. Based on 1992, consumer stocks
p/e's are more than reasonable com-
pared to the Standard and Poor's 500,
especially if the economy remains weak
and companies with cyclical earnings
produce lower than expected results.
Investors are sometimes misled by the
illusion of reported "accounting" earnings
versus real economic "cash earnings". By
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Third Quarter 1991 Page 3
Client Letter
this we mean the amount of excess cash
a company generates over and above its
capital expenditures. Example: A phar-
maceutical (or food/beverage) company
reports $1 15 in earnings and sells for
$20.00 per share for a p/e of 17x. The
stock of a machinery manufacturer (or
auto, chemical, steel) sells at $20.00 per
share and earns $1.50 per share for a p/e
of 13x. The real capital expenditure for
a pharmaceutical (or food/beverage)
company is research and development
(or advertising and promotion for
food/beverage ). These items are ex-
pensed and reduce reported earnings in
the year incurred. However, capital
expenditures for machinery companies
such as maintenance and construction of
its plants are amortized over a multi-year
period. Both expenditures require cash
but the pharmaceutical (and
food/beverage) company is penalized
entirely in one year and the machinery
company is not. If the pharmaceutical
(or food/beverage) company were al-
lowed to amortize these expenses, its
reported earnings might be higher than
the machinery company.
Of course, what makes so many pharma-
ceutical, food, and beverage stocks com-
pelling is that they predictably will have
higher earnings year after year regardless
of the economic environment. A cyclical
company may show losses, or almost no
earnings (and show an infinitely high p/e
multiple). Consumers may not be able
to afford a new auto or new home but
they can afford and will buy necessary
medications, packaged foods, cigarettes,
and soft drinks. These are also the pro-
ducts that the rest of the world is eager
to buy and why international prospects
for these businesses are bright.
The last, and most ironic argument is
that consumer stocks are overpopular.
This view has been expressed by many
major Wall Street brokerage firms over
the last five years. In fact consumer
stocks have been the most under -repre-
sented stocks in institutional portfolios
for some time according to INDATA.
The consensus, in this case, continues to
be wrong and we are pleased to be con-
centrated in areas where most investors
are underweighted.
In last quarter's letter we informed you
that Mary Ann Canter, head trader at
Roxbury Capital had retired. We are
pleased to announce to you that Diane
Maiden has joined us as Assistant Port-
folio Manager/Trader and will be assum-
ing some of Mary Ann's responsibilities.
Diane is experienced and exceptionally
well qualified after ten years as a trader
and assistant to portfolio managers at
Trust Company of the West, a major Los
Angeles investment company..
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TEL:
R?
Dec 19,91
7:48 No.001 P.O1
FAYETTEVILLE.FIRE DEPT PENSION AND RELIEF FUND
PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE 12/31/90 TO 11/30/91
NM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT
ROXBURY
12/31/90
$2,107,956
566,115
INCOME ACCT $2,565,153
deposit 10/01/91 109,000
deposit 11/15/91 __a24,000
2,704,153
DOW JONES IND AVG W/Div Reinvested
S & P 500 W/Div Reinvested
LONG TERM TREASURY BONDS
HIGH GRADE CORP BONDS
CPI (Sept)
NM CAPITAL
ROXBURY
INCOME ACCT (time weighted)
deposits: $139,000
withdrawals; 156,000
INVESTMENT• INCOME PORTFOLIO (NM)
12/06/85
4/23/87
EQUITY PORTFOLIO (ROXBURY)
06/20/86
10/01/86
WITHDRAWALS:
JANUARY $20,000
FEBRUARY20,000
MARCH 20,000
APRIL 10,000
MAY 5,000
JUNE 17,000
JULY 2,000
AUGUST 17,000
SEPTEMBER20,000
OCTOBER 5,000
11/30/91
$2,373,748
684,464
$2,802,308
11/30/91
+13.26
+17.07
+ 11.57
+ 14.28
+ 2.69
+ 12.61
+20.91
+ 10.76
s1,000,000.00
1,647,585.00
$ 312, 657.00
195000.00
507, 657. 00
t,
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MERRILL LYNCH
425 W. CAPITOL, #200
LITTLE ROCK, AR 72701
ATTN: RICHARD YADA
FAYEPR107
CITY OF FAYETTEVILLE FIRE
PENSION & RELIEF FUND
1" • f ' 47
t..
DECEMBER 31, 1991
OCTOBER 1, 1991 - DECEMBER 31, 1991
$ 2,524,732.45 - $14,917.56 (accruals) = $2,509,814.89
TOTAL 0.550% -BALANCE
COMPUTED FEE:
ACCT NO 563 96346
6
3,451.00
$ 3,451.00
$ 3,451.00
*** DUE UPON RECEIPT ***
• NM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, INC
7510 Montgomery Blvd., NE #201
Albuquerque, NM 87109-15
TeL (505) 888-9500
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QUARTERLY REPORT
December 31, 1991
CITY OF FAYETTEVILLE FIRE
PENSION AND RELIEF FUND
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NM Capital Management, Inc.
Quarterly Investment Comment
Year End 1991
t .' w.l aawont's?
As we begin 1992, there are many stand -out topics impacting the financial markets. We highlight
a few important issues as follows:
The Economy - The recovery has been disappointingly slow. Current Fed stimulus through low
short teen interest rates and increased money growth plus some positive tax changes should
reignite economic growth this year.
Interest Rates - The Fed may be signalling an end to its rate reduction process, by dropping the
discount rate a full percentage point from 4 1/2 to 3 1/2% - the lowest level since 1963.
Longer term interest rates may still decline further based upon lower inflation expectations.
Look for increased loan demand in 1992 as households and businesses finance purchases and
investments at these lower rates.
Relative Valuations - The flight from low yielding money market funds and CDs is fueling the
recent surge in the stock and bond markets. With short term interest rates at current lows,
investors in search of higher returns are lengthening their time horizons and are willing to add
to common stocks despite historically high stock market levels. This positive trend in market
liquidity Ls likely to continue in the months ahead and should provide underlying support for
both the bond and stock markets.
The 1992 Residential Elections - Along with the need for President Bush to spur the domestic
economy, proposals should come from both sides of Congress to provide incentives through a
tax reduction package including growth incentives for labor and business, capital gains tax rate
cuts and some relief for real estate investments.
1991 MARKET REVIEW
The stock market during the fourth quarter
was characterized by a November 5-6%
correction followed by a late December 10%
rally to new highs for the popular stock
indices (Standard & Poors 500 and Dow
Jones Industrial Average).
The 1991 annual return for the S&P 500 was
30.4% and for the Dow 24.2% (including
dividends). It is interesting to note that, of
the 30.4% return on the S&P 500 for the
year, 24% was achieved in just three months -
January, February and December.
Pessimism about the faltering economic
recovery contributed to the sharp correction
in the stock market in November. However,
further declines m interest rates triggered the
dramatic upward move in the market during
the last two weeks of the year. For the
fourth quarter, the S&P 500 returned 8.4%.
The Dow Jones Average, which is comprised
solely of large companies, returned 5.8%.
Economic weakness during the fourth quarter
contributed to a continued sharp reduction in
interest rates which began in mid-July 1991.
Government and corporate bond indices,
which benefit from declining rates, returned
5.4% during the quarter. Corporate/govern-
ment bond index returns were also very good
for the year with a return of approximately
16.2%. The majority of that 16.2% (about
11.5%) was achieved during the second half
of 1991 as rates fell.
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ECONOMYAND INVESTMENT OUTLOOK
Economic data released during the fourth
quarter showed deterioration in the recovery,
reversing third quarter optimism. The
faltering economy became increasingly
evident in November with weakness in
leading indicators, industrial production,
employment and consumer confidence. To
apply more stimulus, the Federal Reserve
cont►nued to lower short term interest rates.
The Fed's discount rate cut from 4 1/2% to 3
1/2% (the lowest in 28 years) on December
20 symbolized the Fed's determination to
promote economic recovery.
Long term interest rates also declined sharply
during the fourth quarter. The yield of the
benchmark 30 year Treasury bond dropped
from 8.5% in mid-July to 7.45% by the end of
December. Five year Treasury yields
dropped from 8.0% to 5.95% over the last
five and one half months. The magnitude of
the bond interest rate decline has been
dramatic.
Whether the interest rate decline alone is
sufficient to fdstart the economy is subject to
question. Remember, 1992 is an election
year and it is vital to President Bush that a
recovery be well recognized by early Fall.
Therefore, as further stimulus to recovery, it
is very likely that some changes in taxes will
be proposed soon. Tax changes to promote
investment, growth, jobs and middle class tax
relief should have a positive impact on
consumer confidence. Low interest rates,
rising money supply, and tax changes that
favor investment are powerful stimulants to
economic recovery in 1992.
The rally in the stock market in December
and early January reflects renewed investor
optimism that economic recovery is not far
off. We expect an increasing number of
positive corporate earnings reports as the year
progresses. While improved earnings, lower
interest rates and a lower inflation rate are
ingredients of a good investment
environment, liquidity is a major factor in
the current market rally. The numbers are
staggering as we see more and more maturing
CDs and money market funds reinvested in
stocks and bonds. At current record levels
(Dow 3209, S&P 500 417.6, January 9, 1992),
the stock market appears to be discounting
the projected economic recovery. However,
stronger than expected earnings, lower
interest rates, a capital gains tax cut or other
growth oriented tax cuts could add credibility
to even higher stock market valuations.
EQUITY STRATEGY COMMENTARY
As 1991 drew to a close, it was readily
apparent that investors were continuing to
value shares of companies with solid records
of earnings growth at considerable premiums
to the less popular shares of companies with
slower or less consistent rates of earnings
growth. With the S&P 400 selling at 21 times
trailing -12 -month -earnings, Merck, the
premier drug company at 30 tunes earnings
and Coca-Cola at an effervescent 34 times
earnings, the pressure on investors to give up
and jump on the seemingly limitless train of
higher stock prices and outperformance,
produced by this consumer growth sector of
the market, became almost overwhelming.
The pressure became especially acute when
one of our clients said, "So, why don't you buy
Coke?"
The current popularity of large capitalization,
growth stocks is reminiscent of the 1968-1972
period, when a small group of "blue chip"
stocks with high historic and projected growth
rates, known as the "nifty fifty", rose to very
high P/E ratios. Many investors forgot that
"blue chips" were also associated with casinos
and high stakes poker. By the time investors
woke up to the fact that the price paid today
for projected earnings growth in the future
does matter, the "good at any price", "safe"
growth stocks of the sixties collapsed, falling
an average of 70% between the end of 1972
and September 30, 1974, almost twice the
percentage loss experienced by the average,
less popular stock.
The great investor, Ben Graham, attempted
to point out the difference between
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investment and speculation in his classic book
"Security Analysis". The speculative excesses
which led to the collapse of 1972-1974 had
previously been seen in 1928-1929 when "..no
price could possibly be too high for a good
stock': Ben pointed out that ".. a prime
characteristic of speculative mania is its
complete insulation from all the lessons of
history, whether remote or directly at hand". He
stressed the folly in paying so high a price
today for a projected growth rate in the
future that not only would the above-average
historic growth have to be sustained, but it
would actually have to be exceeded, and that
future investor expectations would then have
to become even more euphoric for the
investor to make an acceptable return. The
odds of an above-average growth rate being
sustained have consistently been shown to be
very low. Thus, the extrapolation of
excessively high trends of growth is extremely
speculative, especially when combined with
well above average prices relative to the
average stock.
Periods of excess and speculation have
occurred in the past and will occur in the
future. The s]dll and knowledge of the true
value investor seeks to avoid participation in
such "bubbles" at all costs. A successful
speculator usually makes money faster than a
successful investor, but the speculator may
also lose it fast. The track record of
predicting when the trend of excess will end,
when the bubble will burst, is extremely poor.
No matter how clear the prognosis for the
popular stocks or how stellar their recent
performance, a diverse selection of soundly
assessed values, with downside protection
vested in real assets and Intrinsic economic
value, provides a far more reliable and less
'risky' potential for above-average return and
the creation of real investment wealth, over
time. These are the kind of stocks we try to
own at NM Capital and why we do not, at
today's "effervescent" prices, own a single
share of Coke.
FIXED INCOME STRATEGY
With bonds having returned 15-16% for 1991,
what is likely in 1992? We do not expect the
lofty returns of last year. It is unlikely bond
rates will decline significantly this year as the
recovery takes hold. Inflation usually remains
subdued in the first year of economic
recovery. Therefore, inflation at ±3% should
not put upward pressure on rates. Continued
accommodation by the Fed is expected until
strong signs of recovery develop. With 1992
an election year, the Fed is motivated to keep
rates low and assure a recovery this year.
Therefore, it is likely short term interest rates
for the time being will stay low and possibly
move lower. This environment should be
favorable for bond returns in the months
ahead. However, as strength in the recovery
is reported, a bottoming in short term rates
could occur. Investor psychology then may
conclude that rates have bottomed for this
cycle and have nowhere to go but up. This
change in perspective would halt any further
bond rally and could cause a meaningful
correction later in the year.
In light of the above concerns, our fixed
income strategy remains focused on
intermediate US Treasury securities. We are
not aggressive buyers of bonds at this time
and will look to taking additional profits from
bonds in the months ahead, particularly if
rates continue to fall.
CONCLUSION
We are optimistic as we look ahead to 1992
and the next several years. The ingredients
for an economic recovery are in place — low
interest rates, growing money supply and
liquidity, low inflation and the prospect of a
pro -growth tax incentive package. With
recovery should come a strong rebound in
corporate earnings particularly benefiting the
stocks of cyclical companies, a number of
which we find to be excellent long term
values. Longer term, the end of the Cold
War and trend toward more democratic rule
and freer trade are very encouraging
developments which will aid world wide
economic growth in the years ahead
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TO 12/31/91
REPORTING PERIOD: 10/01/91
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STATEMENT
2,402,773
0
MARKET VALUE AT 10/01/91
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2,524,732
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12/31/91
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N
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1,360,220
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m ID
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2,266,050
TOTAL INVESTMENTS
ACCRUED INTEREST
ACCRUED DIVIDENDS
MGMT, INC.
16
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1
1
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12/31/91
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TOTAL VALUE
MGMT, INC.
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